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Abstract: Sustainable development issues belong to external non-economical common 
land based concerns. From an historical viewpoint, the main responsibility for the 
current series of global environment problem should be taken on by developed countries. 
Therefore, on sustainable development issue, international society has formed a 
principle of “common but different” responsibility-sharing rule. By game theory model, 
it is found that the reason why the negotiation between developed countries and 
developing ones reaches a deadlock again and again is short of proper conditions or 
mechanism to co-operate. There are at least three prerequisites to solve sustainable 
development issues, none of which has been met so far. 
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1.  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ISSUE 
Since two published reports “Our common future” and “Declare on sustainable development” formally put 
forward the concept of sustainable development, the worldwide discussion on sustainable development has 
become a source of constant discussion.  However, the discussion has not yet achieved a responsible or 
workable breakthrough between the worlds developed and developing countries.  This seemingly endless 
debate continues at all levels of discussion. 
At present, one focus of these quarrels is that developing countries ask the developed ones to bear more of 
the responsibility and be more forthcoming with assistance by providing advanced technology, equipment 
better facilities and funds. For the most part the developed countries promises to the developing countries 
have been strong in words but not in action.  They further compromise the developing countries by asking 
them to slow down their economic expansion and take more effective and strict measures to conserve the 
ecological environment and harness their own environment pollution. As a result of this ongoing debate, 
there appears to be no innovative mechanisms throughout these quarrels that is leading to a solution of the 
sustainable development issue.  The following game model has been constructed to reveal the essence of 
and possible solutions to the issue. 
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Primary assumptions: ①there are only two participating countries in the game, one being a developed 
country and the other a developing one. ②The strategic choices for the developed country are to assist the 
developing country to either harness pollution or not to. ③The strategic choices of the developing country 
are to either take measures to harness pollution or not to.④The amount of assistant fund is h .(including 
economic benefit transformation from non-money assistant manners).⑤The economic costs for 
harnessing pollution is c .⑥The developing country’s economic loss by not seeking to reduce their 
pollution level is w .⑦The developed country’s economic loss because of The developing country’s 
pollution external harm is w′ .(Identically, wwc ′>> , or, without the developed country’s assistance, 
the developing country has a strong motivation to harness pollution).  
The game model can be shown as following: 
By drawing underline method in above double-variable-avail matrix, we can easily find that in this game, 
pollution) harnesst Don',assistanceoffer t Don'(=∗s is a Nash equilibrium, which means that in 
respect to the developed country, its optimal strategy is to choose “Don’t offer assistance” strategy whether 
the developing country chooses “Harness pollution” strategy or “Don’t harness pollution” strategy 
because; whwh ′−−>′−−> ,0 .  The developing country, Whether the developed country chooses the 
“Offer assistance” strategy or “Don’t offer assistance” strategy, its optimal strategy is to choose “Don’t 
harness pollution” strategy because cwchwh −>−−>− , .  
This is the primary reason why a sustainable development theory between develop and developing nations 
has been no good practical function since it was put forward. Because the developing country’s pressing 
task is to develop its economy, pollution and the environmental  problems is accepted as an external 
diseconomy.  These nations have neither the funds, the incentive or the ability to tackle these problems by 
themselves. 
2.  INNOVATIVE MECHANISMS THAT MOVE TOWARDS 
SOLVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 
Continue to assume that there are still only two participating countries, one being developed country and 
the other developing country.  Assume further that an agreement between both countries has been signed 
that every year the developed country must assist the developing country by providing a reasonable amount 
of funds to assist environmental concerns. Assume: ①The strategic choices for the developed country are 
to verify pollution-harnessed conditions in the developing country or not to. ②The strategic choices for the 
developing country are to take measures to harness pollution or not to. ③The amount of assistant fund is h . 
(Including economic benefits transfers from non-monetary assistant).④The developed country’s verifying 
The developing country 
Harness pollution                 Don’t harness pollution
The 
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country 
Offer assistance 
 
 
Don’t offer assistance 
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cost is h′ . ⑤Economic cost for harnessing pollution is c .⑥The developing country’s economic loss 
because of their leaving pollution as is w .⑦The developed country’s economic loss because of The 
developing country’s pollution external harm is w′ .(Identically, wwc ′>> , or, without the developed 
country’s assistance, the developing country has a strong motivation to harness pollution). ⑧fines incurred 
because of not harnessing pollution are z .Generally, hz ′> (therefore the developed country is motivated 
to verify the developing country), and zwc +< (otherwise even if the developed country is likely to 
verify the developing country, the developing country still tends to choose the strategy of “don’t harness 
pollution”).   Therefore, the new game model is changed as following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By drawing the underline method in above double-variable-avail matrix, we find that there exists no Nash 
equilibrium in this game. The detailed process is: To the developed country, if the developing country 
chooses  “Harness pollution” strategy, it would most likely choose a “don’t verify” strategy because of 
hhh ′−−>− , while if the developing country chooses  “don’t Harness pollution” strategy, it would like 
to choose a “verifying” strategy because of whwhhz ′−−>′−−′− . From the perspective of the 
developing country, if the developed country chooses a verifying strategy, it would most likely choose a 
harnessing pollution strategy.  If the developed country chooses a “don’t verify” strategy, it would most 
likely choose a “don’t harness pollution” strategy.  Therefore, by imposing added conditions and a 
verifying mechanism, the sustainable development game is wheeled to beneficial angle.  
3.  FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE VARIANTS’ EFFECT ON 
THE GAME RESULT 
Suppose that verifying probability of the developed country is p , then the no verifying probability is p−1 . 
Similarly, suppose that the probability for the developing country is to choose a “harness pollution” 
strategy q , then the probability for the developing country to choose a “don’t harness pollution” strategy 
is q−1 . Therefore the developed country’s mixed strategy is )1,(1 ppp −= , while the developing 
country’s mixed strategy is 
)1,(
2
qqp −= .  Therefore the developed country’s strategy space is 
t verify)don',(
1
verifys =  and the developing country’s strategy space is 
)pollution harnesst don' pollution, harness(2 =s . 
            The developed country                          The developing country 
strategy     verify       don’t verify                harness pollution       don’t harness pollution 
probability p               p−1                      q                            q−1  
So, the developed country’s prospective revenue function is:  
1 1 2( , ) ( ') (1 )( ' ') (1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )( ')v p p pq h h p q z h h w p q h p q h w= − − + − − − − + − − + − − − −  
The developing country 
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Similarly, the developing country’s prospective revenue function is:  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 2v p , p pq h c p 1 q h w z 1 p q h c 1 p 1 q h w= − + − − − + − − + − − −２ . 
The next step is to pursue mixed Nash Equilibrium ),(
*
2
*
1 pp , which is optimized key. 
1 1
* * * * *
1 1 2 0 1
max ( , ) max[ ( ') (1 )( ' ') (1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )( ')]
pp P
v p p pq h h p q z h h w p q h p q h w
≤ ≤∈
= − − + − − − − + − − + − − − −  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the mixed Nash equilibrium for verifying and monitoring game is ),(
*
2
*
1
* ppp = . In this formula, 
* ( ,1 )c w c wp
z z
− −= − ， *2 (1 , )h hz zp = − . 
The above formula mean that if '1 hq
z
−＜ ，the developed country will choose “verify” strategy, on the 
contrary, if '1 hq
z
−﹥ ，the developed country will choose “don’t verify” strategy, and only when 
* '1
h
q
z
= − ，will the developed country choose mixed strategy, choosing either “verify” strategy or “don’t 
verify” strategy(for there is no revenue difference between both strategies). Similarly, if c w
z
p −＜ ，the 
developing country will choose “don’t harness pollution” strategy, on the contrary, if c w
z
p −﹥ ，the 
developing country will choose “harness pollution” strategy, and only if c w
z
p −= ，will the developing 
country choose mixed strategy, choosing either “don’t harness pollution” strategy or “harness pollution” 
strategy(for there is no revenue difference between both strategies). 
From above, it is clear that the mixed Nash equilibrium for verifying and monitoring game is linked with 
economic cost for harnessing pollution c .The developing country’s economic loss w , fines z , and the 
developed country’s verifying cost h′ .  
For the developing country, if the amount of fines z is the result of not harnessing pollution and being 
verified is fixed, the lower the developed country’s verifying cost h′ , the bigger the probability *q  for the 
developing country to choose “harness pollution” strategy , and the higher the developed country’s 
verifying cost h′ , the smaller the probability *q  for the developing country to choose “harness pollution” 
strategy, because the developing country considers that the developed country’s verifying probability is 
variable in the opposite direction to its verifying cost. If the developed country’s verifying cost h′ is fixed, 
2 2
* * * * *
2 1 2 0 1
max ( , ) max[ ( ) (1 )( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 )( )]
p P q
v p p p q h c p q h w z p q h c p q h w
∈ ≤ ≤
= − + − − − + − − + − − −  
* * * * *1 ( ) (1 )( ' ') (1 )( ') 0v q h h q z h h w q h q h w
p
δ
δ = − − + − − − − + − − − − =
 
* * * *2 ( ) ( ) (1 )( ) (1 )( ) 0v p h c p h w z p h c p h w
q
δ
δ = − − − − + − − − − − =
 
{
* c wp
z
−=
* '1 hq
z
= −
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the higher the fine z  which is caused because of not harnessing pollution and being verified, the bigger 
will be the probability *q  for the developing country to choose “harness pollution” strategy, while the 
lower the fine z  which is caused because of not harnessing pollution and being verified, the smaller the 
probability *q  for the developing country to choose “harness pollution” strategy, because the developing 
country may consider that the higher the fine z , the bigger the risk that it takes because of not harnessing 
pollution. 
For the developed country, if economic cost for harnessing pollution c and the developing country’s 
economic loss w are fixed, the higher the fine z  which because of not harnessing pollution and being 
verified, the smaller the verifying probability of the developed country *p , while the lower the fine z , the 
bigger the verifying probability of the developed country *p , because the developed country may consider 
that the higher the fine z  which is caused because of not harnessing pollution and being verified, the more 
the developing country dare not take risk. If the fine z  which is caused because of not harnessing pollution 
and being verified is fixed, the bigger economic cost for harnessing pollution c  and the smaller the 
developing country’s economic loss w , the bigger the verifying probability of the developed country 
*p , 
because the developed country may consider that on this situation the probability *q  for the developing 
country to choose “harness pollution” strategy becomes smaller, while the lower economic cost for 
harnessing pollution c and the bigger the developing country’s economic loss w , the smaller the verifying 
probability of the developed country 
*p , because the developed country may consider that on this situation 
the probability *q  for the developing country to choose “harness pollution” strategy becomes bigger. 
4.  RESEARCH CONCLUSION 
Sustainable development issues belong to external non-economical common land decisions. To resolve this 
problem, at least three prerequisites to solve sustainable development issues must be met. First, the 
developed country must assist the developing country. Second, there must be a kind of verifying 
mechanism as an incentive for the developed country to provide money and technology. Third, the fine z  
which is caused by not harnessing pollution and being verified must be set big enough. Whether the 
developing country may take action to maintain the world’s sustainable development is correlated with 
economic cost for harnessing pollution c , the developing country’s economic loss w  because of pollution, 
the fine z  happens because of not harnessing pollution and being verified, the developed country’s 
verifying cost h′ , and so on.  This is especially if it is strongly correlated with the fine z  which happens 
because of not harnessing pollution and being verified. The higher the fine z , the more strongly the 
developing country is pushed to solve its own pollution problem.  
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